Convincing State-Builders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia

Kristin M Bakke,John O'Loughlin,Michael D Ward,Gerard Toal

doi:10.1111/isqu.12110

Abstract

De facto states, functional on the ground but unrecognized by most states, have long been black boxes for systematic empirical research. This study investigates de facto states’ internal legitimacy—people's confidence in the entity itself, the regime, and institutions. While internal legitimacy is important for any state, it is particularly important for de facto states, whose lack of external legitimacy has made internal legitimacy integral to their quest for recognition. We propose that the internal legitimacy of de facto states depends on how convincing they are to their “citizens” as state-builders. Using original data from a 2010 survey in Abkhazia, we examine this argument based on respondent perceptions of security, welfare, and democracy. Our findings suggest that internal legitimacy is shaped by the key Weberian state-building function of monopoly of the legitimate use of force, as well as these entities’ ability to fulfill other aspects of the social contract.

Highlights

De facto states, functional on the ground but unrecognized by most states, have long been black boxes for systematic empirical research
The collapse of the Soviet Union and armed conflicts in Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova were followed by the emergence of a number of such “statelets”—Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria—but de facto states exist in other parts of the world and have been features on the international scene for decades
Given that protecting citizens from external threats is central to what it means to be a functioning state, we find that the more people are concerned about the prospects for a new war with Georgia, the less likely they are to think that Abkhazia is moving in the right direction (Model 2) and the less likely they are to trust the president (Model 3)

Summary

Introduction

Functional on the ground but unrecognized by most states, have long been black boxes for systematic empirical research. People’s perceptions of how good de facto states are at doing the things that states do will shape their belief in the entity’s right to exist as an independent entity, their acceptance of its regime, and their trust in its political institutions.9 Armed groups sometimes engage in wartime governance activities, such as establishing territorial control, protecting civilians, or providing public goods (for example, McColl 1969; Wickham-Crowley 1987; Wood 2003; Kasfir 2005; Mampilly 2011).

Results

Conclusion