Convergence and divergence in corporate governance

Abstract

PurposeWhether corporate governance systems and practices are converging to the Anglo-American shareholder-value-oriented model or continue to diverge from this model and maintain their idiosyncrasies has been controversially debated among scholars in a variety of academic disciplines. The purpose of this paper is to review, critique and integrate the disparate positions in the convergence-divergence debate in corporate governance and to suggest promising directions for future research.Design/methodology/approachThe author constructs a theoretical framework in which convergence and divergence dynamics are conceptualized as simultaneous processes of institutional change and continuity. This framework takes into account the influence of economic market forces, social embeddedness and cultural forces in shaping corporate governance at the national and the firm levels and provides a holistic and integrative perspective on the extant literature in the convergence-divergence debate.FindingsThe literature review does not support either the predictions of convergence advocates or the predictions of divergence advocates. Instead, the paper finds that convergence and divergence dynamics can coexist and lead to increasing heterogeneity in corporate governance arrangements of firms within and between corporate governance systems. This finding adds complexity to the debate and opens room for interesting research directions.Originality/valueThe paper offers a comprehensive review of the topic and draws from literature in financial economics, comparative law, economic sociology, international business, political science and strategic management. Most importantly, the paper offers a multi-theoretical framework that allows for an integration of the divergent perspectives presented in the literature.