Conventional Military Doctrines and U.S.-China Military Engagement in the West Pacific

Abstract

This article explores how conventional military doctrines shape U.S.-China military engagement in the West Pacific under varying degrees of cooperation, competition and potential conflicts. Although military doctrines possess a certain level of influence on the ways and means of engaging each other in military terms, such engagement is not confined to using deadly force with a clear aim to destroy the other party. Instead, these doctrines can act as an instrument to forestall conflicts by maintaining credible deterrence. As rational actors that follow clear rules of military engagement, both the United States and China are fully aware of the defensive, offensive and deterrent value of their respective military doctrines, as well as the consequences of a potential conflict; and they have tried to expand cooperation on a number of non-traditional security issues. However, given their forward deployment-oriented military doctrines and the rising role of non-state actors, the United States and China are very likely to be engaged in an unintended escalation of conflicts if each holds a rigid view toward the other’s military doctrine and fails to maintain stable military ties based on timely communication and constructive interaction.