Abstract
Conflict of interests between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders could affect executive compensation contracts. In this paper, we use data on Chinese listed companies and show that controlling shareholders’ tunneling reduces the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. These results suggest that while incentive payment schemes are generally adopted in Chinese listed companies, controlling shareholders who obtain private benefits from listed companies have less incentive to strengthen the relationship between executive pay and firm performance.
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