Abstract
This paper examines the issue of how to control fiscal corruption by providing incentives to fiscal officers. A model is developed to portray the incentive effects. The results indicate that simply providing bonuses is not enough. Corruption at higher levels of management has to be contained so as to allow bonuses to become more effective, and thereby to initiate a “virtuous circle”. These findings are supported by a case study of a successful attack on fiscal corruption in Ghana.
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