Abstract

BackgroundThe World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control measures. However, the extent to which States Parties have implemented the Convention varies considerably. Article 5.3 of the FCTC, is intended to insulate policy-making from the tobacco industry’s political influence, and aims to address barriers to strong implementation of the Convention associated with tobacco industry political activity. This paper quantitatively assesses implementation of Article 5.3’s Guidelines for Implementation, evaluates the strength of Parties’ efforts to implement specific recommendations, and explores how different approaches to implementation expose the policy process to continuing industry influence.MethodsWe cross-referenced a broad range of documentary data (including FCTC Party reports and World Bank data on the governance of conflicts of interest in public administration) against Article 5.3 implementation guidelines (n = 24) for 155 Parties, and performed an in-depth thematic analysis to examine the strength of implementation for specific recommendations.ResultsAcross all Parties, 16% of guideline recommendations reviewed have been implemented. Eighty-three percent of Parties that have taken some action under Article 5.3 have introduced less than a third of the guidelines. Most compliance with the guidelines is achieved through pre-existing policy instruments introduced independently of the FCTC, which rarely cover all relevant policy actors and fall short of the guideline recommendations. Measures introduced in response to the FCTC are typically restricted to health ministries and not explicit about third parties acting on behalf of the industry. Parties systematically overlook recommendations that facilitate industry monitoring.ConclusionHighly selective and incomplete implementation of specific guideline recommendations facilitates extensive ongoing opportunities for industry policy influence. Stronger commitment to implementation is required to ensure consistently strong compliance with the FCTC internationally.

Highlights

  • The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control measures

  • Data analysis We evaluated the strength of Article 5.3 implementation with reference to two indicators which provide a basis for exploring residual opportunities for policy influence: a) the number of specific recommendations acted upon by each Party; and b) the strength of specific measures undertaken compared to specific guideline recommendations

  • Overview of compliance and implementation Methods of implementation Implementation is primarily passive. It is achieved through existing policy instruments introduced independently of the FCTC which govern conflicts of interest in public administration, political financing, and transparency in lobbying and which reflect recommendations 4.4, 4.6, 4.8, 4.10 and 4.11

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The World Health Organization (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) stands to significantly reduce tobacco-related mortality by accelerating the introduction of evidence-based tobacco control measures. Civil society organizations (CSO) have consistently identified tobacco industry political influence as the key cause of weak FCTC implementation [9,10,11,12,13,14] This is strongly supported by document based studies of tobacco companies’ political activities which illustrate their success over several decades in weakening, delaying, and preventing the introduction of public health measures [15,16,17,18]. In 2015, WHO reported over twothirds of reporting Parties had taken steps to prevent the tobacco industry from interfering with tobacco-control policies [8] Whilst this data suggests a significant increase on the 2012 reporting cycle [8], it only outlines whether Parties have taken some action under Article 5.3, and provides no indication of the strength of Parties’ efforts [21, 22], in terms of the number of recommendations acted upon (selective implementation), or the extent to which discrete recommendations are acted upon (incomplete implementation)

Methods
Results
Discussion
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call