Abstract
The problem of networking supervision and traffic rate control in multi-service network systems is studied by using concepts of Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg strategy under assumption of two-level system architecture. Models of users, network provider and overall system in game-theoretic setting are presented. Linear Stackelberg incentive strategies are derived for both elastic and non-elastic traffic, and verified using Kelly's example. Outlines of the two-level integrated control and supervision architecture, and of the proposed fuzzy-Perti-net supervisor are given.
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