Contrasting differences in identity and agency between narrative and autopoietic systems

Nico Buitendag

doi:10.4102/hts.v69i1.1966

Abstract

The article aims at contrasting the autopoietic understanding of an individual and her or his actions as described by Niklas Luhmann with Paul Ricoeur’s notion of narrative identity, focusing on people as legal subjects. The article assumes that when legal subjects necessitate ethical engagement and evaluation, the law could cease to deal with problems in a mere legalistic fashion but is allowed the freedom to appeal to norms of justice external to itself as in other natural law theories. Through narrative identity the deeds of role players are to be understood in greater complexity than what a self-referential legal system is comfortable in dealing with.

Highlights

During the last few decades the description of autopoietic systems by Niklas Luhmann has become an important and influential model for how we think about law
When legal subjects are understood in a framework that necessitates ethical engagement and evaluation, law could cease to deal with problems in a mere legalistic fashion and is allowed the freedom to appeal to norms of justice external to itself as in other natural law theories
The implication is that the true weight and nuanced character of human action is reduced in complexity, dragged across the boundary into the legal system, and described in ways that do not reflect it accurately

Summary

Introduction

During the last few decades the description of autopoietic systems by Niklas Luhmann has become an important and influential model for how we think about law. In social systems the individuality of persons – as part of society – is an important self-description of society’s own idea of itself. Moeller (2006:89) asks the question: ‘What am I if we are all Greeks?’ Human identity is not seen as a complex narrative where each individual has their own history and motivations and goals. It allows for the individual to see himself as a coherent temporal identity, as a person and as an acting agent.

Results

Conclusion