Contractual Mechanisms in National Park Management: A Multi-Task Principal–Agent Model

Abstract

In the management of national parks, the principal–agent relationship is key to efficient and effective management. Based on multi-task principal–agent theory, this study examines the dual functions of central government incentives and guidance and the objectives of local National Park Administration offices in environmental conservation and reasonable resource utilization. First, this study constructs a multi-task principal–agent model for central and local governments within the national park management system and identifies effective contractual mechanisms. Second, this study examines the relationship between the intensity of central government incentives and the ecological conservation atmosphere coefficient. Third, by integrating the three stages of national park management system advancement, this study explores the central government’s incentive strategies at different stages. The findings indicate that local governments receive limited ecological conservation support, underscoring the need for long-term central government incentives. The findings also confirm that the effective management of national parks by local governments can only be achieved by eliminating external uncertainties, reducing the variable costs of innovative advancements, and controlling risk aversion in local National Park Administration processes. In addition, this study includes empirical data for sensitivity analyses to understand the robustness of the model under different scenarios. This study offers valuable insights and practical suggestions for enhancing national park management.