Contractibility, Strategy, and Network Dynamics: From Franchising to Licensing

Abstract

The article examines the network dynamics from franchising to licensing due to the increase of contractibility of the franchiser's system-specific assets as determinant of the allocation of decision rights between the network partners. Based on the property rights approach, residual decision rights must be allocated according to the distribution of intangible knowledge assets between the franchiser and franchisee. Our analysis derives the following hypothesis: The more contractible the franchiser's system-specific assets, the higher is the tendency from franchising toward licensing. In addition, we investigate the impact of strategy change on the standardization (contractibility) of system-specific assets and the network governance. We argue that a change of strategy may increase the contractibility of system-specific know-how and consequently the tendency toward licensing. This study presents empirical evidence from company Getifix on the network dynamics from franchising to licensing.