Contract-Theory-Based Incentive Design Mechanism for Opportunistic IoT Networks

Abstract

Industrial Internet of Things (IoT) and Industry 4.0 enable interconnection among various devices. An opportunistic IoT network is an ad hoc network that is formed by the nodes (e.g., smart vehicles and mobile phones) by utilizing various short radio range techniques. In this kind of network, information forwarding and dissemination among other smart devices is based upon the opportunistic contact nature mainly due to network dynamics and user mobility. Routing plays an important part in these kinds of networks since there does not exist a pre-established route (Tyagi and Kumar, 2013). Nodes are often selected dynamically based upon many parameters such that messages can be delivered successfully to the destination devices or sinks. However, these intermediate nodes are often selfish because routing these packets costs energy. In the case of incomplete cooperation and asymmetric information, message delivery can be severely degraded, which increases the network delay affecting the overall network performance. Therefore, this work proposes an incentive design mechanism based on the contract theory to reward intermediate nodes appropriately to forward the messages. The contract theory is used to model the forwarding-forwarder node interaction as a labor market with private information. First, the users are classified into a finite number of types according to their ability of forwarding the message, and the service trading between the forwarding and forwarder nodes is properly modeled. Furthermore, the necessary and sufficient conditions are derived to provide the incentives to the nodes involved in the message forwarding. Extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanism is effective in providing incentives and outperforms other benchmark schemes in terms of delivery probability, average latency, and overhead ratio.