Contraceptives for Victims of Rape and for the Mentally Disabled: A Reply to Stephen Napier

Abstract

In this paper I argue for the following claims. First, contraceptive acts are intrinsically wrong, and not merely always wrong within the marital context. Second, in consequence, the defense of the administration of contraceptives in case of rape must be understood under the rubric of the principle of double effect. Third, the existence or threat of rape is therefore not a sufficient condition for the permissible administration of contraceptives; the intention must be upright. Fourth, in the case as described by Stephen Napier, the intention with which contraceptives would be administered is almost certainly contraceptive; thus this administration would be an instance of an intrinsically evil act. Recognition of why this is so is the key to understanding why, despite a prima facie agreement, as noted by Napier, between his own position and that of Germain Grisez, there is nevertheless a rather deep disagreement. I articulate that disagreement, and indicate why I believe the question has not been fully resolved by Napier's essay.