Abstract

We consider a general family of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols utilizing displaced thermal states with discretized modulations. Separating the effects of the Gaussian channel and the non-Gaussian distribution, we have studied the dependence of the secret key generation rate on the magnitude of modulations (the strength of the modulated signal). We show that in the limit of strong signal, QKD is impossible: from the perspective of an efficient eavesdropper, the ensemble of transmitted states is effectively classical. This constitutes a quantum correction to performance of finite-length QKD protocols. We demonstrate that two regimes must be distinguished: weak and strong thermal noise. In the case of strong noise, the security boundary is mostly determined by the weak-signal limit. When the noise is weak, however, QKD may become possible only when the signal strength exceeds some critical value.

Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call