Continuous and impulse controls differential game in finite horizon with Nash-equilibrium and application

Abstract

This paper considers a new class of deterministic finite-time horizon, two-player, zero-sum differential games (DGs) in which the maximizing player is allowed to take continuous and impulse controls whereas the minimizing player is allowed to take impulse control only. We seek to approximate the value function, and to provide a verification theorem for this class of DGs. By means of dynamic programming principle (DPP) in viscosity solution (VS) framework, we first characterize the value function as the unique VS to the related Hamilton–Jacobi-Bellman–Isaacs (HJBI) double-obstacle equation. Next, we prove that an approximate value function exists, that it is the unique solution to an approximate HJBI double-obstacle equation, and converges locally uniformly towards the value function of each player when the time discretization step goes to zero. Moreover, we provide a verification theorem which characterizes a Nash-equilibrium (NE) for the DG control problem considered. Finally, by applying our results, we derive a new continuous-time portfolio optimization model, and we provide related computational algorithms and numerical results.