Abstract
The paper examines John Horton’s realist political theory, in particular his critique of John Rawls’s “high” or “liberal moralism”, and seeks to determine the extent to which, together with Horton, we would have reasons to leave Rawls’s and other Rawlsian accounts behind. The paper argues that some of the insights of Horton’s realism are mistaken, whereas many of those which are not mistaken are compatible with liberal moralism correctly understood. The argument is also formulated in terms of contingency, in particular in terms of a contrast between the realist emphasis on the contingency of human existence and the liberal moralism’s neglect or inability to properly account for it, due to a strong focus on necessity.
Highlights
The paper examines John Horton’s realist political theory, in particular his critique of John Rawls’s Bhigh^ or Bliberal moralism^, and seeks to determine the extent to which, together with Horton, we would have reasons to leave Rawls’s and other Rawlsian accounts behind
Even if political philosophy appeared to be dead in the 1950s and 60s, by the 1970s it had risen like a phoenix from the ashes, and its revitalisation was attributable in large part to the liberal theory advanced by John Rawls in his 1971 book
The aim of this paper has been to offer a limited defence of liberal moralism against the criticisms offered by various kinds of realist
Summary
Truth and Consequences’ in World Politics, Vol.[11], No., October 1958, pp. 89-102. 3 Brian Barry ‘The Strange Death of Political Philosophy’, in Democracy and Power, Oxford, Clarendon, 1991, pp. 11-23. 4 For a critique of this line of thinking see the title essay in Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, Princeton, University Press, 2005, pp.18-28. 5 This term is used by Galston in ‘Realism in Political Theory’, European Journal of Political Theory, Vol 9(4), 2010, pp. 385-411. 6 ‘Liberal moralism’ is John Horton’s favoured term. 7 In this paper, I use the terms ‘political philosophy’ and ‘political theory’ interchangeably. The extent to which Horton’s account of realism seems (to me, anyway) to focus on the contingent character of our lives, and the extent to which his commitment to realism is motivated by this recognition of contingency and by the conviction that Rawlsian liberalism is either neglectful of it or unable to accommodate it.[8] in the second part of the paper, I argue, pace Horton, that liberal moralism, at least as it appears in Rawls, is just as alert to the contingency of life as is realism It is the importance and ubiquity of contingency that motivates Rawlsian liberalism in the first place.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
