Abstract

Humans use kinematic temporal and spatial information from the environment to infer the causal dynamics (e.g., force) of an event. We hypothesize that the basis for these inferences are malleable and modulated by contextual temporal and spatial information. Specifically, the present research investigates whether the extent of a person’s ongoing experience with direct causal events (e.g., temporally contiguous and spatially continuous) alters their use of time and space in judgments of causality. Participants made inferences of causality on animated launching events depicting a blue ball colliding with and then “launching” a red ball. We parametrically manipulated temporal contiguity and spatial continuity by varying the duration of contact between the balls and the angle of the second ball’s movement. We manipulated participants’ level of exposure to direct causal events (i.e., events with no delay or angle change) between experiments (Experiment 1: 2%, Experiment 2: 25%, Experiment 3: 75%). We found that participants adjust the temporal and spatial parameters they use to judge causality to accommodate the context in which they apprehended launching events. Participants became more conservative in their use of temporal and spatial parameters to judge causality as their exposure to direct causal events increased. People use time and space flexibly to infer causality based on their ongoing experiences. Such flexibility in making causal inferences may have adaptive significance.

Highlights

  • The ability to infer causal structure in events is a central feature of human cognition (e.g., Hume, 1740/1960, 1748/1977; Michotte, 1946/1963)

  • We investigate whether contextual information provided by recent and ongoing experience with direct causal events influences participants’ judgments of how time and space contributes to causality

  • Generalized linear mixed models analysis demonstrated that participants in Experiment 2 used kinematic temporal and spatial information when inferring causality

Read more

Summary

Introduction

The ability to infer causal structure in events is a central feature of human cognition (e.g., Hume, 1740/1960, 1748/1977; Michotte, 1946/1963). Many researchers argue that the ability to infer causal relationships in physical and social events is an innate facet of human cognitive systems (e.g., Michotte, 1946/1963; Leslie, 1982, 1984; Leslie and Keeble, 1987; Oakes and Cohen, 1990; Scholl and Tremoulet, 2000; Blakemore et al, 2001; Wolpert, 2003, 2006, 2009). This ability allows us to understand relationships in our environment, predict future outcomes, and plan goal-directed actions. The kinematic properties of objects in time and space fundamentally contribute to our judgments of causality in mechanical events

Methods
Results
Discussion
Conclusion
Full Text
Published version (Free)

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call