Contesting Autocracy: Repression and Opposition Coordination in Venezuela

Maryhen Jiménez

doi:10.1177/0032321721999975

Abstract

Opposition coordination varies widely in electoral autocracies. Sometimes, opposition parties are highly coordinated and create alliances, present joint candidates or common policy platforms. Yet, at other times, oppositions choose to challenge incumbents individually. This article seeks to explain what drives opposition parties to coordinate in non-democratic regimes. It finds that opponents’ decision-making and strategy formation is influenced by the amount of repression they face from the incumbent regime. It argues that repression has a curvilinear relationship with opposition coordination. When repression is low and high, opposition coordination will be informal or clandestine. However, when repression is at intermediate levels, opposition parties will formally coordinate to dislodge authoritarian incumbents. This article illustrates this argument through an analysis of the Venezuelan opposition under Chavismo (1999–2018), combining 129 interviews with party elites, journalists, academics, and regime defectors, along with archival research at key historical moments.

Highlights

Opposition coordination varies widely in electoral autocracies
The argument is twofold: (1) repression shapes the incentives for coordination and (2) oppositions can coordinate either in informal or formal ways, depending on the levels of threat they face at a particular point in time
The literature has argued that opposition coordination (OC) is important for opposition success in authoritarian regimes

Summary

Introduction

Opposition coordination varies widely in electoral autocracies. Sometimes, opposition parties are highly coordinated and create alliances, present joint candidates or common policy platforms. This article seeks to explain what drives opposition parties to coordinate in non-democratic regimes It finds that opponents’ decision-making and strategy formation is influenced by the amount of repression they face from the incumbent regime. When repression is at intermediate levels, opposition parties will formally coordinate to dislodge authoritarian incumbents. In Venezuela, opposition parties created the alliance Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) to collectively challenge Hugo Chávez, and Nicolás Maduro These examples show that when oppositions coordinate, they are more likely to increase their competitiveness and/or secure partial victories under authoritarian rule. Contrary to the plausible expectation that regime opponents will always ally to oust incumbents, we observe a puzzling variation in coordination efforts: opposition parties have only at specific times chosen to present a unified front. I use an in-depth within-case study to explain the causal pathway between repression and coordination between 1999 and 2018

Findings

Discussion

Conclusion