Abstract
The paper proposes a novel principle of rational self-locating belief that refers to the epistemic agent’s causal context. The principle is motivated and applied to some of the most-discussed problems of self-locating belief including the Doomsday Argument, the Serpent’s Advice scenario, the Presumptuous Philosopher problem, the Sleeping Beauty problem, and the problem of confirmation in the Everett interpretation. It is shown to yield plausible verdicts in all these cases.
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