Abstract
Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information acquired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and assuming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed. The paper explains: (i) how the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) how they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) why there could not be a conflict between the different varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why the traditional epistemological inquiry is inclined to overestimate the role of propositional perceptual knowledge. Keywords: Radical enactivism, perceptual knowledge, knowledge-how, knowledge-that.
Highlights
Assuming a radical stance on embodied cognition, according to which the information acquired through basic cognitive processes is not contentful (Hutto and Myin, 2013), and assuming that perception is a source of rationally grounded knowledge (Pritchard, 2012), a pluralistic account of perceptual knowledge is developed
Offers a welcome dissolution of an otherwise persistent skeptical anxiety, viz. If we were in a radical skeptical scenario, we would entertain the same perceptual states as we do in non-skeptical scenarios and yet we would fail to access the world
The underlying supposition is that perceptual knowledge is conceived exclusively as knowledge-that, but even if we eschew this supposition and follow a Rylean line – offering a non-reductionist account of other forms of perceptual knowledge, such as knowledge-how/where/when – we have to face some challenges, viz. explaining (i) why the varieties of perceptual knowledge fall under the same broader category; (ii) whether they are subject to the same kind of normative constraints; (iii) whether there could be a conflict between the non-propositional and the propositional varieties of perceptual knowledge; and (iv) why perceptual knowledge is not the way that traditional approaches usually take it to be, namely, as abounding propositional knowledge
Summary
The main claim of embodied views of cognition is that cognition cuts across brain, bodily actions and the environment. Hurley (2001), for instance, holds that cognitive processes are horizontally modular in structure and involve internal states, the body and the environment, with input and output in feedback loops. They claim, assumes that there is a principled way of distinguishing cognitive processes from causally relevant factors, which in turn hinges upon the idea that cognition is contentful whereas causal or external events are not intrinsically contentful They propose REC (Radically Enactive Cognition), the view that basic minds are contentless: some higher mental processes are characterized by vehicles carrying contentful information, there is a non-empty class of contentless processes which constitute our fundamental interactions with the environment. These basic processes are explained by one’s actions, and the information they convey is explained in terms of the scientifically respectable notion of information as covariance. The argument that cognition is not to be confused with causally relevant factors (because it supposedly involves content) does not undermine the embodied stance insofar as that argument only assumes, but fails to explain in the naturalistic framework, the notion of contentful information
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