Abstract

The relationship between the Russian government and the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) has increasingly become the object of much scrutiny. The debate centres on the question of whether or not the ROC enjoys inordinate influence over the Russian political sphere. This article examines one case in which the Moscow Patriarchate has attempted to influence federal policy, namely, by lobbying the state to include courses on ‘Orthodox culture’ in the federal curriculum. The article draws on social movement theory to argue that the ROC has, to date, failed in its endeavour, as a result of a combination of three factors. First, it has failed to persuade either the state or society that teaching ‘Orthodox culture’ in schools is a worthy cause. Second, it has been unable to demonstrate a united front on the issue, revealing serious disagreements within the ranks of both clergy and laity regarding the content and form of the proposed curriculum. Third, it has been unable to demonstrate that it represents a constituency sufficiently numerous for the government to take its interests seriously in this case. The article thus argues that the relationship between church and state in the Russian Federation is more contentious than frequent joint appearances of clerical and lay leaders would suggest, and that the ROC is in the position of a junior partner whose ability to influence the state is circumscribed by important societal and political factors.

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