Contempt for the Poor, Esteem for the Rich: The Interplay of Comparison and Sympathy in Hume’s Treatise

Abstract

ABSTRACT Hume’s concept of sympathy is often discussed in isolation from the concept of comparison, which plays an important role in his social and moral philosophy. If both concepts are discussed at all in tandem, comparison is often seen as disruptive of sympathy, which is, in addition, treated as the more natural stance toward others. This article reverses this line of interpretation in presenting the comparative stance as equally fundamental as the sympathetic stance and as potentially outweighing it. Further, it analyzes the complex interplay of both psychological stances in either upholding or uprooting relations of inequality. In contrast to many positive readings of the moral role of sympathy, I argue that sympathy often obstructs the uptake of the comparative mode by fostering imaginary identification with positions of wealth and power. What I will label “comparisons from below” are thus transformed into non-comparative sympathy. At the same time, the socioeconomically privileged, through what I call “relational proximities of power,” do compare downward even if this implies overcoming large affectively stabilized socioeconomic distances. Since sympathy is responsible for producing the general esteem for wealth and privilege, I conclude that it mirrors structures of inequality as much as it helps to establish emotionally backed judgments that help to strengthen these structures.