Contemplation and the Human Good

Abstract

What ought we to do when we encounter an apparent contradiction in the writings of a philosopher? If the philosopher is not a great one, we can perhaps satisfy ourselves that the contradiction reflects his or her muddle-headedness or indecision. If the philosopher is a great one, charity demands other interpretations, especially if the contradiction affects important doctrines. Recent commentators on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics have noticed an apparent contradiction in his account of the human good, eudaimonia (references [ 1], [4], [9], [10], [11], [13], [15], and [ 18]). Some of their interpretations either amount to politely-phrased charges of muddle-headedness or indecision or provide tacit support for such charges. One would think from such interpretations that Aristotle was not a great philosopher, and certainly not the father of logic. Such interpretations seem both uncharitable, given Aristotle's greatness, and implausible given the textual evidence. In this paper I shall discuss the provocative and helpful of these interpretations, and provide what I take to be a more charitable and more plausible interpretation based upon a wider range of evidence than is usually adduced. In NE 1.7 Aristotle lays down two apparently distinct conditions for the human good. These are teleiotes and autarkeia, often understood as finality and self-sufficiency. He plainly says that the human good meets both of these conditions (1097bl9-20). But on the face of it no one thing-no one life or activity-could meet both. Autarkeja or selfsufficiency requires that the human good be inclusive-so inclusive that no addition could improve it (1 097b 15-19). Teleiotes is, literally and awkwardly, endishness, and there are degrees of this (1097a25-30). The human good Aristotle seeks is teleiotaton, most final, and never chosen as a means to anything else, but only for its own sake. Other goods--e.g., honor and pleasure-we choose both as means and for their own sakes.