Containing the Crisis: I The British Period

Abstract

In the small hours of Christmas morning, 1963, the British Ambassador in Ankara was summoned by the Turkish Foreign Minister. He was told that as a full-scale attack was being mounted against the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey was asking that British and Greek forces join the Turkish contingent in Cyprus to ‘separate’ the parties and ‘stop the fighting’. Otherwise, Turkey would have to act alone.1 The proposal was entirely in keeping with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and, if its premise was correct, was of the sort which might have been anticipated. But it was far from the kind to which Britain was keen to consent. She therefore said in reply that the time was not yet ripe for military action, but that she would urgently assess the situation with her two fellow guarantors (pointedly, however, not calling them that, but ‘allies’)-2 Greece, unsurprisingly, took the same line. Turkey’s response was to press for an early joint assessment, and call the Nato Council into session.