Abstract
We present a model of the propagation process of bank runs. A bank failure alone is not sufficient to trigger a panic. In accord with the empirical evidence, runs become contagious only during periods of macroeconomic instability. In addition, we make a clear distinction between illiquidity and insolvency as possible causes of bank failures. We also show that, despite the possibility of runs, the deposit contract is superior to autarky.
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