Abstract

When a person with contagious measles has travelled by aircraft, European guidelines recommend contact tracing of passengers and crew within 5 days of exposure for post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP), and within 12 days of exposure for informing passengers and crew, in order to prevent further transmissions. To be effective, contact tracing requires prompt diagnosis, immediate notification of public health authorities and rapid availability of passenger contact data. We report two events of contact tracing initiated in Germany after two individuals with measles travelled on three international flights. In one event, contact tracing was initiated late because laboratory confirmation of a clinically diagnosed measles case was awaited unnecessarily. Accessing passenger contact data was difficult in both events because of data protection issues with the airline which was not based in Germany. In both events, passengers were not reached in time to provide PEP, and one event resulted in at least two secondary measles cases. As all passengers were reached before the incubation period ended, tertiary cases were most probably prevented. Public health authorities and the transport sector must collaborate to resolve competing legal regulations for infection prevention and data protection, to simplify and accelerate identification of air travellers exposed to communicable diseases.

Highlights

  • Measles is an acute, highly infectious viral disease that is usually transmitted by direct contact with infectious droplets

  • We report two events of contact tracing initiated in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany, after two individuals with measles travelled on three international flights

  • local health authorities (LHA) 2 was informed about the possible measles case (Case 2) on Day 4, only 1 day after the return flight, but awaited laboratory confirmation before initiating contact tracing

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Summary

Introduction

Highly infectious viral disease that is usually transmitted by direct contact with infectious droplets. Genotyping was subsequently performed by the German national reference laboratory In both events, local and state health authorities decided to initiate contact tracing of flight passengers and crew. LHA 2 was informed about the possible measles case (Case 2) on Day 4, only 1 day after the return flight, but awaited laboratory confirmation before initiating contact tracing. In agreement with the NRW SHA, passenger data was requested for the return flight only, because 7 days had passed since the outbound flight (Germany to Italy). Contact information for this purpose was not available on the airline’s website, the LHA directed its request to the airline’s service centre, which was difficult and time-consuming. We did not receive information in either event about whether potentially exposed crew members were informed

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