Contact theory and the concept of prejudice: Metaphysical and moral explorations and an epistemological question

Abstract

Gordon Allport’s Contact Hypothesis has been greatly advanced over the decades into what is now called Contact Theory. The application of the theory toward the improvement of intergroup relations has had the effect of concealing the fact that Contact Theory is fundamentally a prejudice theory and not a theory of intergroup relations. This article focuses on the concept of prejudice by following the ways in which Allport worked with the concept prior to and after the publication of The Nature of Prejudice. The focus is not on the definitional correctives of prejudice that have been offered but on the metaphysical and moral perspectives that Allport adopts in his conception of prejudice. The exploration of these issues reveals a number of challenges and implications for Contact Theory that contact researchers have yet to contend with. The paper also poses an epistemological question to the theory asking: how was prejudice selected as the source of intergroup strife? Taken together the paper calls for a re-examination of the place and role of prejudice in Contact Theory and in turn a re-evaluation of the theory itself.