Consumer rebate strategy for a manufacturer selling price‐quality differentiated products

Abstract

AbstractIn this study, we consider a scenario where a manufacturer offers two price‐quality differentiated products, which we label “regular” and “upgraded,” through a retailer and uses direct rebates to customers to stimulate sales. Therefore, the critical question posed is: If a customer rebate is provided, should it be on the regular, upgraded, or both products? Consequently, we compare the outcomes of eight options from a manufacturer's perspective. The analysis reveals that the manufacturer's choice is not straightforward. Rebates on both products can lead to higher profit for the manufacturer if the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers is moderate. However, product quality becomes critical as the proportion of rebate‐sensitive consumers increases. If the quality of the regular product is too high or too low, then the manufacturer may use a rebate only on the regular product; otherwise, it should be on only an upgraded product. The rebate value on an upgraded product continuously decreases with regular product quality if a rebate is introduced only on an upgraded product, but its nature changes in other contexts. Quality improvement investment is also a critical factor that affects the manufacturer's decision. Because an analytical assessment of the effectiveness of rebate promotion under the price‐quality consideration is still missing in the literature, the decision to initiate a rebate promotion might be considered on an ad hoc basis. Therefore, the explicit thresholds identified in this study can help managers to make rebate decisions comprehensively.