Abstract

Optimal incentive schemes for continuous time Stackelberg games with linear state dynamics and quadratic cost functionals are constructed. The leader is assumed to have perfect or partial information on the past values of the state and on those of the follower's decision. The permissible strategies for the leader are affine in the data available and they are represented by Lebesgue-Stieltjes integrals.

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