Constructing the Path to Eastern Enlargement: The Uneven Policy Impact of EU Identity by Ulrich Sedelmeier (review)

Abstract

i88 SEER, 86, I, 2008 thisaffair remains unclear. And so, Iwould add, is the answer to the question as towhether Meciar's political leeway was indeed seriously limited by the country's largely ceremonial presidency? Haughton does not provide us with a clear answer. The abduction of the president's son and other violent inci dents point to another aspect ofMeciar's rule on which Haughton does not elaborate: the function of political repression. It certainly deserves more atten tion than the single reference the author gives to the more 'sinister' features of Meciar's semi-authoritarian rule. Given the vast political debate and academic literature on EU and NATO enlargement and on the promotion of good governance and democracy, the international environment counts as one of the most relevant determinants of early post-Communist politicians' behaviour. It is extremely difficult to prove causality between international influences and the behaviour of national politicians. Haughton concludes that this impactwas limitedwhich, regarding the effect of EU policies in particular, is supported by other empirical research. The enlargement strategy, based on the notion of conditionality, proved to be largely ineffectualwhen the target government had no interest in or clear prospect of EU accession (or other 'carrots'). Institutions matter, Haughton righdy asserts. Meciar not only used and manipulated the institutionsof democracy, but he was also shaped by the rules and procedures that he himself had helped to install in post-Communist Slovakia. In this respect, Constraints and Opportunitiesof Leadership in Post Communist Europe adds furthernuance to the image of the 'backward looking bully', the 'clever thug', or the 'naked power seeker' which have become the customaryWestern and oppositional Slovak interpretations ofMeciar and his rule. Still, the extent towhich institutions limited Meciar's room tomanoeuvre remains unclear. While Haughton's analysis seems to indicate that the con straining effectsof institutions,public opinion and the international environ ment were rather limited,his conclusions point in a differentdirection: Meciar did indeed have less political leeway thanmost contemporary observers once thought. Department of European Studies Andr? W. M. Gerrits Universityof Amsterdam Sedelmeier, Ulrich. Constructing the Path to EasternEnlargement:The UnevenPolicy Impact ofEU Identity. Europe in Change. Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2005. xii 4- 220 pp. Figures. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?55.00. The eastward expansion of the EU has generated a vast amount of literature and placed the topic of enlargement into themainstream of EU studies. The ongoing challenge that the enlargement process continues to present for the EU means that attempts to theorize enlargement dynamics are vital in order to provide analytical frameworks with which to better understand this latest episode of expansion and also to provide insights into how the enlargement process could unfold in the future. In this book, Ulrich Sedelmeier, who REVIEWS 189 has been somewhat prominent in this fieldof late, focuses on two key puzzles surrounding theEU's enlargement policy towards Central and East European states (CEECs). First, why did those incumbent member states perceiving more costs than benefits from enlargement decline to deploy theirveto power and prevent enlargement going ahead? Second, why did the EU acquiesce with some of the new members' demands for the entry conditions and not others? This is particularly pertinent in that the accommodation of the new member states' preferences was evident in policy areas where this would be least likely according to rationalist/liberal intergovernmentalist logic due to the existence of 'domestic interest group pressure as a central factor in shaping government preferences, which they then defend in inter-state bargaining' (p. 4). Sedelmeier argues that a key reason why opposition to enlargement did not translate into enlargement outcomes, and why the rationalist/liberal intergovernmentalist approach therefore only tells part of the story, is to do with the fact that on this occasion at least enlargement policy transcended material interestsand relative bargaining power. The EU's policy on eastward enlargement was empowered by the 'EU's collective identity vis-?-vis the CEECs' (p. 9) which was todo with the 'Yalta factor' and themoral obligation of Western Europe to not only accept theCEECs' right to return to Europe but also to offerpractical as well as political assistance to thatgoal. This collective EU identity isportrayed as...