Constructing ``quality'': The political economy of standards in Mexico's avocado industry

Abstract

As the world's leader inavocado production, Mexico produces anestimated 900,000 tons/year, of which the stateof Michoacan produces 83% of nationalproduction and 40% of world avocado productionwithin five regional districts. In 1914 theUnited States imposed a phytosanitary banagainst Mexican avocado exports to the USmarket, a non-tariff barrier that stood despiteNAFTA. This paper examines increasedstandardization of product quality in avocadoas a political process in Michoacan duringthe 1980s and 1990s, during which differentregional groups and firms struggled to imposetheir standards and defend their economicinterests in the market. In the 1990s, alliedwith the Mexican government, elite avocadogrowers mounted a phytosanitary campaign thatconvinced the USDA and US government to liftthe ban and allow Mexican avocado imports intothe US market in 1997. Since 1997 the Mexicangovernment has expanded Michoacan'sphytosanitary campaign, imposing internationalstandards on all avocado growers, even thoseproducing for the national market. By expandingthe campaign and institutionalizing newstandards of quality, industry experts nowconsciously link phytosanitary quality tocommercial quality. They propose atransformation of previously acceptedproduction and post-harvest practices.Theoretically, increased standards of quality,accompanied by systematic methods of evaluationand verification, should benefit all producers.However those growers producing for thenational market adhere to new rules designed toimprove product quality yet receive noimmediate, tangible economic benefits. Thiscase study demonstrates that theinstitutionalization of product standards iscarried out within an existing politicalsystem. Understanding whose standards countrequires careful analysis of how powerfulactors in specific agricultural industriesreshape and define standards of quality interms that benefit themselves.