Abstract
This paper discusses theoretical and empirical research on how two constitutional features, electoral rules and forms of government, affect economic policymaking. The authors begin by outlining some key objectives of democratic political constitutions and by pointing out the inertia and systematic selection that characterize real-world constitutions. They then introduce the main concepts used to categorize work on constitutions: different kinds of electoral rules and forms of government. They then discuss how these elements of constitutions affect the accountability of government and the size of political rents and corruption, as well as the representativeness of government and a variety of fiscal policy choices.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
