Abstract
Responding to Jan Komarek’s “Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent Power: A Reply to Mark Tushnet” I argue that positing that constitutions “recognize” rights from some external source presents the problem, addressed in the theory of the right of revolution, that constitutions might “recognize” the wrong set of rights, and in particular might recognize as rights principles that should not so qualify. In a related argument, I contend that exercises of the right of revolution need not be only to protect the constitution, but can occur against a government that is faithfully complying with a defective constitution.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
