Constitutional Populism in South Africa

Abstract

South African constitutionalism has always contained the ingredients for a populist turn, and that turn is now decidedly occurring. This paper argues that the main political factor driving this development is the ongoing struggle for control of the governing African National Congress (ANC). That struggle currently sees a moderate constitutionalist faction pitted against a 'radical economic transformation' (RET) faction consisting of supporters of former President Jacob Zuma. Against the background of the rising influence of the left-wing populist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the ANC's RET faction has decided that there is political advantage to be had in fronting some of the EFF's policies. These currently include a proposal to amend the 1996 Constitution to allow for 'expropriation without compensation' and the nationalization of the Reserve Bank. Rather than an attempt to head off the EFF's rising influence, the paper argues, these developments should be seen as a political wedge that the RET faction is using to gain control of the ANC. By floating these proposals, the RET faction is backing the constitutionalist faction into a corner, forcing it either to resist them, and in so doing accept responsibility for any resultant loss of electoral support to the EFF, or embrace them, and in so doing allow the RET faction to dictate the ANC's political direction. In addition to exploring these dynamics, the paper situates the South African case in the comparative literature on constitutional populism and suggests ways in which that literature needs to be revised to take account of it.