Abstract
AbstractThis article examines the relationship between constitutional pluralism and authoritarianism. It does so since the Weiss decision of the FCC spurred unusual attacks on constitutional pluralism. This particular theoretical vision of European integration has been described as inherently dangerous and its abandonment has been called for out of chiefly instrumentalist reasons, in order to prevent constitutional pluralism turning into an autocrats’ refuge. The article argues this critique of constitutional pluralism does not succeed. Due to its truncated, exclusively positivist understanding of constitutional pluralism, it has failed to take into account pluralism’s normative core. The latter presents itself an antipode to authoritarianism, which means that the autocratic regimes simply cannot credibly avail themselves of the theory of constitutional pluralism to justify their authoritarian actions.
Highlights
This article examines the relationship between constitutional pluralism and authoritarianism
Exclusively positivist understanding of constitutional pluralism, it has failed to take into account pluralism’s normative core. The latter presents itself an antipode to authoritarianism, which means that the autocratic regimes cannot credibly avail themselves of the theory of constitutional pluralism to justify their authoritarian actions
The FCC ruled that the European Central Bank by not taking sufficiently into account the principle of proportionality in the exercise of its monetary competences within the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) exceeded its powers under the Treaties and acted ultra vires
Summary
In answering the question of constitutional pluralism as a facilitator of authoritarianism, one must first reflect on the nature of the argument being made about the rapport between constitutional pluralism and authoritarianism. If constitutional pluralism is conceptually, an sich, lending itself as a tool for autocrats, this, at least indirectly, must suggest its own autocratic character, which disqualifies it as a theory that a reasonable, bona fide person, let alone an expert in EU law, could subscribe to It appears that it has been this second claim that has been put forward by the critics of constitutional pluralism. Constitutional pluralism is inherently prone to abuse by autocrats, not just because they can abuse it, but since, as the adjective “inherently” must suggest, it is a priori flawed and unsustainable In other words, it follows from this circular and self-referential debilitating critique of constitutional pluralism that the latter is fundamentally flawed, unsustainable and prone to autocratic abuse, because it is flawed, unsustainable and prone to autocratic abuse. This becomes clear when one looks more closely into pluralism’s normative core
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