Constitutional design preferences: An experimental approach

Abstract

Abstract A rich literature links the survival of national constitutions to their legitimacy among citizens. However, most studies examine constitutions as a bundle of rights and institutions, and few test the micro-foundations of constitutional preferences explicitly. This article examines how individuals evaluate both the content and flexibility of discrete constitutional elements using a conjoint experiment in Japan. Respondents were asked to rate twenty-six hypothetical constitutions that varied randomly in their enumeration of twelve rights and institutions. We find that citizens generally prefer constitutions that enumerate more provisions, with greater weight placed on human rights than political institutions. This result largely confirms theoretical expectations from earlier work on comparative constitutional design. In addition, political factors, such as partisanship, moderate preferences on issues that have long divided progressives and conservatives in Japan, such as constraints on the military and establishing national emergency provisions. By contrast, socioeconomic characteristics such as income, age, and education do not, suggesting broad demographic consensus on the merits of distinct provisions. Importantly, we further demonstrate that citizens do not trade off constitutional detail and flexibility, as suggested by existing research. Respondents who prefer the enumeration of more provisions do not necessarily want a lower amendment hurdle to facilitate adaptation to new circumstances. Preferences about constitutional flexibility appear to be based on strategic imperatives, notably the desire to cement preferred provisions and prevent changes by future majorities.