Abstract

Contrary to modern representative democracies where elections tend to take place years apart, in the direct democracy of ancient Athens the assembly of the citizens met to decide policy up to forty times per year. The paper explores a model of constitutional choice where self-interested citizens decide how long to wait until they vote by maximising the net gain from an uncertain voting outcome. It is found that the frequency of voting increases unambiguously when the probability of being a member of the winning majority increases, and decreases with the loss from being a member of the losing minority and the resource cost of the vote. Under some plausible conditions, the frequency also rises with increases in the utility gain from the vote, the discount rate, and the required majority to pass a policy motion. It is argued that those conditions were met in Athens.

Highlights

  • In the direct democracy of Athens, 508—322 BCE, decisions about public affairs were taken at the meetings of the assembly of the citizens, where those attending deliberated and voted

  • An important exception is work on the political business cycle which recognises that the discretion of governments to call an election before one is due may affect significantly expectations and thence the short–run equilibrium values of output and inflation

  • A practical example of franchise extension in the ancient Athenian democracy was the grant of full citizenship rights to metics and ex–slaves

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Summary

Introduction

In the direct democracy of Athens, 508—322 BCE, decisions about public affairs were taken at the meetings of the assembly of the citizens, where those attending deliberated and voted. From ten meetings per year in the early days of democracy, the number of times the assembly met rose sharply to forty per year in the second half of the fourth century. This choice raises the following fundamental trade– off: A citizen who benefits from the current policy may wish to postpone a vote for as long as possible, because of the risk that a policy change will harm his interests, while providing more time until taking a new vote allows the collection of more information, more reflection and presumably better choices.

Election frequencies in representative democracies
The Athenian assembly
Related literature
A formal model of constitutional choice of the election timing
Explaining the frequency of the Athenian assembly meetings
Findings
Conclusions

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