Constitutional Change Through Euro Crisis Law: 'Czech Republic'

Abstract

The paper analyses the impact of Euro Crisis Law -- the legal instruments adopted at European or international level in reaction to the Eurozone crisis -- on the legal and constitutional structures in the Czech Republic. It shows that while the Czech Republic has absented from most of the Euro Crisis Law, it has nevertheless chosen or discussed very similar measures to stabilise its public finances. There are structural and political reasons for the reluctance to commit to the ESM, the Fiscal Compact, or the Banking Union. On the structural level, the Czech Republic was forced to stabilise its banking sector following the banking crisis in the late 1990s in consequence of politics of transition to free market economy after the 1989. Also, the public debt, though on the rise, has been one of the lowest in the EU. On the political level, the opposition to the Euro Crisis Law was lead by part of the elite with different political-economic ideology, for whom further integration in Europe takes vital tools from the Member States to deal with this sort of crises. The leading voice was President Vaclav Klaus and his supporters within the centre-right Civic Democratic Party. Although, his mandate ended, his views are carried out further by the Czech Central Bank's board, whose majority consists of his appointees.