Constitutional Change in Switzerland

Abstract

The article presents a case of successful change in Switzerland, the re-assignment of responsibilities between the federal government and the cantons and the new fiscal equalization scheme, which was adopted in 2004 by referendum. By starting from the general assumption that ways and means are needed to strengthen general interests at the expense of distributive interests in discussions, the article endeavors to identify favorable conditions for successful change. By using insights from constitutional political economy and actor-centered institutionalism, four such conditions are revealed: the procedural separation of problem solving and bargaining interaction modes; the importance of ideational factors like frames, causal theories, and focal points; active agenda-crafting; and the structuring of debates by earlier decisions. In addition, this article highlights that other conditions, more directly linked to interest and interest struggle, can help to mitigate the intensity of distributive conflicts and are therefore indirectly conducive to a problem-solving interaction orientation of actors. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.