Constitutional Autonomy and its (Un)making

Abstract

To grant the Muslim majority princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) a special accommodation in the Indian context via Article 370 had been a novel constitutional experiment. The negotiations between the ruler of the state and the government of India formalized the ‘Accession’ of J&K with India, and Article 370 reflected the conditions of the constitutional relationship between the two. Being an exceptional provision that gave birth to a separate, but not independent, constitution (of Jammu and Kashmir), why has not Article 370 of the Indian constitution, or more precisely Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomous status, stood the test of time? Was the unmaking ingrained in the very making of Article 370 or an outcome of its antithetical use by successive Indian governments? What concerns, motivations, and ambitions influenced the J&K leadership during this constitutional exercise? These are questions that this paper seeks to answer. This paper argues that the repeal of Article 370 was inevitable due to the nature and context of its initial framing as much as its subsequent institutional-political working, and that the guarantee of autonomy was essentially, from the very genesis, meant to lead to a complete integration of J&K with the Indian Union without any special constitutional autonomy.