Constitutional Asymmetry in the People’s Republic of China: Struggles for Autonomy Under a Communist Party-State. A Country Study of Constitutional Asymmetry in China

Abstract

Although the People’s Republic of China (PRC) boasts of a variety of asymmetrical entities in its constitution, practice displays a low tolerance for any meaningful autonomy. As a party-state constituted under the authoritarian leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), most of the PRC’s national-level institutions and governance repertoires are duplicated at subnational levels to enhance supervision. Two notable constitutional asymmetries occur at the provincial level, where the PRC lists five Ethnic Minority Autonomous Regions (EMARs: Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Guangxi) and two Special Administrative Regions (SARs: Hong Kong and Macau). On paper these entities appear to benefit from significant grants of political, social and economic autonomy tailored to local circumstances. In reality, the Chinese party-state deploys such veneers where convenient to maintain the appearance of benevolence while asserting its will. Though the form differs the ends are the same: the PRC’s administrative subdivisions are structured to provide for comprehensive integration, including the firm and effective transmission of Beijing’s policies to all corners of the state. The nation’s present retrocession toward dictatorial governance augurs against the realization of genuine autonomy in the immediate future.