Constitutional Amendment and the Democratic Mediation of Political Disagreement: Assessing the Impact of Deliberative Mini-Publics

Abstract

Ireland has been to the forefront of the constitutional turn in deliberative democracy, with referendums on same-sex marriage and abortion—held following deliberative mini-publics — attracting global attention. Little more than cursory reference has been made, however, to the recommendations of Ireland’s deliberative mini-publics that did not gain traction in the constitutional amendment process. To address this blind-spot, we present the first comprehensive account of the political take-up of recommendations for constitutional amendment made by Ireland’s deliberative mini-publics. We show that of 28 discrete recommendations, only three resulted in constitutional amendment. Recommendations were much more likely to lead to constitutional amendments if (a) they responded to real points of political disagreement where there was already some public interest in constitutional change, and (b) they did not contradict deep-seated commitments of legislative majorities. The best explanation for this record, we suggest, lies in the role that constitutional amendment processes play in the mediation of political disagreement. It is not merely the case that constitutional amendment procedures underwrite the stability of other constitutional processes; the impetus for constitutional amendment is generated through ordinary constitutional processes, with the support of a legislative majority required for constitutional change. This connects constitutional amendment with the other components of the constitutional framework for the mediation of disagreement: legislation and judicial decision-making. As such, assessments of impact must specify what role a deliberative mini-public played over and above general political attitudes.