Constitutional amendment and term limit evasion in Africa

Abstract

Drawing on experiences in relation to successful and attempted amendments to term limit provisions, the chapter argues that constitutional provisions on amendment matter and play an important role in structuring political power. The chapter explores patterns of constitutional amendment rules in the region, showing that, as compared to other regions, formal rules in Africa are relatively flexible. It also shows that constitutional change is somewhat frequent. At the same time, the region features an unusually dense concentration of rules that make formal constitutional amendment unavailable. The combination of "unamendable" provisions with relatively easy "normal" rules of amendment provides an example of a "tiered constitutional design," in which levels of entrenchment vary with the level of importance of the provision. Africa's experience with constitutional design, we conclude, shows the promise, and to some extent the peril, of such rules, but confirms the normative desirability of tiering as an approach to democratic politics.