Constitutional adjudication in the system of separation of powers. American impacts in Hungary

Abstract

Throughout the world one can find two basic models of constitutional adjudication: the American and the Kelsenian ones. At first sight one could easily differentiate them with the mere fact that in the American model there is no separate constitutional court; constitutional adjudication is incorporated into the judicial system. The essay argues that the differentiation is more complicated. The base of distinction is not the existence of a constitutional court. The essay chooses a functional approach and analyses if the activity of constitutional adjudication is closer to the judicial branch or it is “negative legislation” as Kelsen originally thought. Such an approach requires the analysis of separation of powers and the competences of constitutional courts; especially the abstract law review and individual complaint. Hungary’s new constitution changed the role of the constitutional court. The essay concludes that due to the changes the Hungarian system of constitution adjudication made a great step towards the American model from the Kelsenian one.