Constitutional adjudication and constitutional governance in the Horn

Abstract

Disputes among branches and levels of governments are bound to arise in federations. How do emerging federations ensure the supremacy of the constitution and address such dispute where power remains less institutionalised? This chapter argues that among the several factors behind the crisis of governance in the countries in this study is the failure to institutionalise political power and lack of constitutionalism, which could be linked in turn to the absence of functioning constitutional dispute-resolution mechanisms in the countries. The lack of functioning institutions that provide basic services and security as a result of years of civil war in Somalia and South Sudan makes governance complex indeed. Yet there are already indications that even in these two countries, the failure to institutionalise and limit power has left political actors free to impose personal rule. Overall, federalism or devolution in the Horn operates without effective institutional safeguards to umpire intergovernmental disputes. In Ethiopia, it is a political institution exposed to political manipulation; in South Sudan, the Supreme Court has yet to establish its independence; and in Somalia, it is altogether absent and the substance of power it is required to adjudicate is yet to be defined.