Constitution reform for responsible government in Trinidad and Tobago

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn Westminster-type parliamentary systems, critical checks and balances are placed upon the Government by parliamentary accountability (‘responsible government’), which lies at the core of the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy. Trinidad and Tobago, a former British colony that became independent in 1962 and a constitutional Republic in 1976, has the Westminster system of government where the Executive is drawn from the Lower House and is dependent upon it for its authority. It has a bicameral legislature and its Parliament comprises the President, a nominated Senate and the House of Representatives. Constitutionally, like some Caribbean countries, the number of parliamentary members who can be made government Ministers is unlimited, which can prevent constitutional sanctions, such as a no-confidence vote, despite any abuse of government power. Amendments to the Constitution are proposed to strengthen parliamentary democracy: firstly, limiting the number of ministers; secondly, ensuring that the Government is not guaranteed a simple majority of votes in the Senate. Further, it is argued that if the Prime Minister recommends to the President such number of Ministers that, ab initio, would preclude either responsible government or a successful no-confidence vote in the Government, the President, in whom executive authority is vested, could use reserve/prerogative powers to refuse to make such appointments.