Constitution Making Under Governments of National Unity: The Zimbabwean Case 2009–2013

Abstract

Constitutions are the bedrock of democratic governance in the contemporary world and any state claiming democratic credentials needs to base its claims on a good constitution and positive constitutionalism. In the period from 2009 to 2013, Zimbabwe was ruled by a negotiated government of national unity (GNU). The government, a result of inconclusive presidential elections in 2008 was tasked with writing a new constitution to take the country out of the crisis that it has undergone since the turn of the century. The GNU duly set upon this task and wrote the constitution which was passed by parliament in May 2013. Against this background, this paper seeks to analyse the Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) driven constitutional making process. Using a qualitative methodology based on participant observation and document analysis, the paper shows that the process was fraught with irregularities and ushered in a negotiated constitution in place of the initially touted people driven constitution. Thus the paper intends to reveal the pitfalls of a negotiated constitution making process. The paper concludes that in a transitional period, people driven constitution making is at the least too ambitious and at the worst totally unfeasible.