Constitution Making: A Rational Choice Model of the Federal Convention of 1787

Abstract

This study offers a theoretical and statistical analysis of the voting behavior of the delegates to the United States Constitutional Convention. The theoretical paradigm employed is rational choice, a model in which individuals are viewed as expected utility maximizers. Logit analysis is used to test the model empirically. Sixteen different roll calls are investigated. The empirical results suggest that the Founding Fathers may have voted both their personal and their constituents' economic interests when those interests were at stake. The measures of constituents' interests contain the most explanatory power. When there was no clear benefit or cost to specific economic interests, voting at the convention appears not to be related to those interests. The study differs from previous investigations because it analyzes individual roll calls under two separate hypotheses and utilizes data on constituent interests as well as on the wealth, economic interests, and probable voting stances of the 55 delegates to the Federal Convention of 1787. The results suggest that the importance of economic interests in constitution making should be given a more prominent role in the political science literature.