Constitution as Social Contract in Contemporary Ethiopia: The Need to Re-construct Political Arrangements

Abstract

Constitutions represent social contracts that accommodate subjective interests of groups within the framework of impersonal shared interests among citizens of the society at large. This article examines the contemporary social contract theory in relation to the constitutional making process in Ethiopia. The lawmaking process of Ethiopia’s 1995 Constitution does not fulfil the procedural legitimacy of social contract because important sections of the society were neglected. The institutions created by the FDRE Constitution denote the subjectivist approaches to social contract theory thereby ignoring the impersonal interests of the society. To accommodate both the subjective ends and impersonal interests of the society, the Constitution should be reconstructed in light of the dualist contemporary social contract theory. This article argues that Ethiopia's contracting actors should consider both the subjective and impersonal interests of society. The article examines the conditions that make constitution a social contract. It also discusses the controversies concerning Ethiopia's Constitution in light of the theory of social contract, and tries to show what the Constitution should fulfil as a social contract in contemporary Ethiopia.