Constituent power(s) in a dualistic democracy

Abstract

I engage with Andrew Arato’s theory of constituent power explicated in The Adventures of Constituent Power and bring together two ideas introduced in the book – post-sovereign constituent power and dualistic democracy. I suggest that the combination of these two ideas allows us to extend the application of Arato’s theory. I contrast Arato’s ‘dualistic democracy’ with Bruce Ackerman’s well-known idea of dualist democracy in order to establish the differences of the two models and to criticize Arato for applying his theory of constituent power only to exceptional moments of constitution-making. I then develop the idea of the empty place of constituent power, unwrapping Claude Lefort’s influence over Arato’s theory. By introducing Lefort’s framework, I show how an understanding of dualistic democracy beyond Ackerman can allow to think of non-exceptional post-sovereign constituent power.