Consolidation of Nonstate Armed Actors in Fragmented Conflicts: Introducing an Emerging Research Program

Abstract

How do armed groups consolidate power in conflict landscapes packed with rival factions, paramilitary militias, and local warlords? Extant scholarship has studied the causes and consequences of rebel fragmentation, but the reverse process in which power that is dispersed among many armed actors becomes concentrated among a handful of factions is underexplored. In this special issue, we bring together eight case studies to illustrate at least three pathways to militant consolidation. Cooperative consolidation involves organizations growing consensually through alliance formation and mergers. Competitive consolidation entails a gradual process of increasing political and military power by outcompeting rival groups for fighters, popular support, and international sponsors. Coercive consolidation occurs when militant organizations violently eliminate rivals. This framing article considers several factors that may explain the choice of consolidation mode, including the role of territorial control, permeability of group boundaries, and state sponsorship. By investigating this under-examined aspect of civil conflict, we forge fundamentally new theoretical ground in the study of internal wars and weakly-governed societies.